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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
GUY I-I. WIGHT and 
FLORENCE D. WIGHT, his wife, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
vs. 
EUGENE CALLAGHAN and 





STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action by landlords against tenants 
for unpaid rent, cleaning expenses, items removed 
and da1nages to the premises. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the court which rendered 
a judgment for the landlords. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents seek to uphold the judgment of 
the trial court, and to have this appellate court 
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award them the sum of $500.00 for attorney's fees 
in answering appellants. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellants' brief has not cited the page of the 
record supporting any statements under their state-
ment of facts as required by Rule 75 [p] [2] [2] [d]. 
Appellants' statement of facts refers to three 
written leases. These are Exhibits 2, 3 and 4. Both 
defendants executed Exhibits 2 and 4. Defendant 
Eugene Callaghan did not sign Exhibit 3. Both de-
fendants enjoyed uninterrupted possession of the 
home from March 1, 1957 up to July 29, 1963. (R 
366 lines 7-22) 
By the terms of the written leases executed by 
the parties, the defendants were to keep the home 
and real property in a clean and satisfactory condi-
tion and upon termination of the tenancy, to leave 
the premises, equipment and furnishings in as good 
a condition as when entered upon except for reason-
able wear and tear or damage by the elements or 
fire. (paragraph No. 3 of Exhibits 2, 3 and 4) 
By the terms of said written leases the defend-
ants agreed to pay the plaintiffs for all damage or 
injury to the premises during their tenancy. (para-
graph No. 3 of Exhibits 2, 3 and 4) 
By the terms of said written leases the defend-
ants agreed to pay for cleaning the premises upon 
the termination of the leases. (paragraph No. 4 of 
Exhibits 2, 3 and 4) 
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The written lease agreements between the par-
ties provide that should the Lessor be compelled to 
commence or sustain an action to collect rent or for 
damages the Lessee shall pay a reasonable attorney's 
fee to the Lessor. (paragraph No. 8 of Exhibits 2, 
3 and 4) 
At paragraph No. 3 on page 3 of appellants' 
Statement of Facts they refer to making structural 
improvements to the property. There is no evidence 
in the record of any improvements made to the prop-
erty by the appellants. The fact the appellants filed 
a counter claim alleging certain improvements to 
the property ( R 6) does not establish as a fact that 
improvements were made. The trial court dismissed 
this counterclaim prior to trial ( R 10) . 
Throughout appellants' brief they have contro-
verted Findings of Fact made by the trial court. 
Rather than setting forth in this Statement of Facts 
the evidence supporting the facts as found by the 
trial court respondent will refer to the record under 
the points set forth under the argument. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE DOES SUPPORT A FIND-
ING THAT THE DEFENDANT EUGENE CAL-
LAGHAN WAS LIABLE FOR ALL CLAIMED 
DAMAGES. 
The deposition of Eugene Callaghan was taken 
by his attorney on September 6, 1963. Defendants' 
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4 
motion to open and publish this deposition was 
granted by the trial court. (R 371 line 10) 
At the taking of his deposition Eugene Callag-
han admitted that he and Mrs. Callaghan had been 
leasing property from Mr. and Mrs. Guy Wight at 
3621 Highland Drive under three separate written 
leases. (page 3 of Eugene Callaghan deposition) 
Eugene Callaghan admitted entering into an-
other lease with the respondents for the period from 
the 1st of March, 1959 to the 29th of February, 1960. 
(page 8 of deposition) 
The defendant Eugene Callaghan was shown 
a copy of the lease which he had not signed and was 
asked: 
Q. Is this a copy of a lease which you 
intended to execute between yourselves and 
the Wights? 
A. Yes, as far as I know that is. 
Q. Do you know any reason why your 
signature does not appear thereon as a lessee 
when your name appears as one of the lessees 
in the typed part of the document? 
A. I was not here. I was in Brazil at the 
time this was dated and it was not sent to 
me for my signature by Dr. Wight. (page 22 
of Eugene Callaghan deposition.) 
When Dr. Wight was questioned regarding the 
second lease he stated that he had discussed it with 
Mrs. Callaghan and she agreed that she would sign 
the lease and he would sign the lease and that they 
would not send it to Cyprus for Mr. Eugene Callag-
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5 
han's signature. (R 46 line 2-4) Dr. Wight testified 
that Eugene Callaghan indicated to him that he was 
happy that his wife and family were living in the 
home during this period. ( R 46 line 17-19) 
The evidence is uncontroverted that both de-
fendants enjoyed possession of the home from their 
execution of the first lease until they surrendered 
the premises to the plaintiffs on July 29, 1963. (R 
366 lines 20-22) 
Appellants -argue that the case should be re-
manded for elimination of all items of damage 
charged to the defendant Eugene Callaghan which 
occurred between the end of the first lease and the 
commencement of the third lease. The only law which 
appellants cite on this point is a general statement 
to the effect that the burden of proving agency rests 
on the party alleging it. 
Appellants have overlooked numerous cases sup-
porting the proposition that it is not essential to the 
validity of a lease for the purpose of binding the 
lessee that it be signed by the lessee, provided he 
accepts the lease and acts thereunder. Jacobson v. 
National Tea Co. (1924) 51 ND 889, 200 NW 910; 
Holbrook v. Chamberlin (1874) 116 Mass 155, 17 
Am Rep 146; William Wicke Co. v. Kaldenberg Mfg. 
Co. (1897) 21 Mise 79, 46 NYS 937; Carroll v. St. 
John's Catholic Total Abstinence & Mut. Relief Soc. 
(1878) 125 Mass 565; Fitton v. Hamilton City 
(1870) 6 Nev 196; Munford v. Humphreys (1924) 
68 Cal App 530, 229 P 860; Means v. Dierks (1950, 
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CAl 0. l(an) 180 F2d 306. These cases stand for the 
proposition that a lease signed by the landlord alone 
is binding on the tenant where he has accepted the 
lease and taken possession of the property. 
In the Fitton v. Hamilton City case the Nevada 
Supreme Court said: 
It is the plainest dictate of justice and 
right, that if one obtain possession and occupy 
premises under a lease, he should be holden 
to accept it subject to all the covenants and 
obligations of the instrument. supra 6 Nev. 
200 
In the case of Spann v. Gulley (1958) 233 Miss 
62, 101 So. 2d 337 a formal lease was prepared by 
the lessor as requested by the lessee. The lessee re .. 
mained in possession without notifying the lessor 
that the terms of the lease were unacceptable. The 
court upheld the action for rent for the period the 
premises were occupied stating that the lessees' were 
bound by the lease they had not signed because of 
their remaining in possession and failing to notify 
that any terms of the lease agreement were unsat .. 
isfactory. 
In the case the defendant Eugene Callaghan 
executed the first lease agreement dated January 
18, 1957. (Exhibit 2) The second lease agreement 
not signed by Eugene Callaghan specifically states 
that Eugene Callaghan and Edna S. Callaghan, his 
wife, are lessees. (Exhibit 3) The third lease dated 
May 10, 1960 is executed by both defendants. (Ex-
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hibit 4) There ·never was any termination of both 
defendants quiet and peaceable enjoyment of the 
premises. 
One further principle precludes the necessity 
for remanding this case to the trial court under this 
Point I. This is based upon the fact that the time 
the damages occurred is within the knowledge of 
the defendants and not the knowledge of the plain-
tiffs. Defendants resided at the premises and had 
possession of the premises during the full term of 
Exhibits 2, 3 and 4. Plaintiffs did not check for dam-
ages even though they might have been on the prem-
ises during the terms of the lease because they be-
lieved right up to the end of the tenancy that the 
defendants were going to purchase the premises. 
(R 103 lines 10-15) Mrs. Wight testified that she 
was not around this house more than half a dozen 
times in the six years that the defendants rented it. 
(R 154 line 27) She testified that the defendants 
had frequently told her that they were going to buy 
the home and for this reason she did not pay any 
special attention to their upkeep of the home. (R 
160 lines 1-23 ) 
POINT II. 
PLAINTIFFS DID PROVE THAT DAMAGES 
OCCURRED WHEN LEASES WERE IN EF-
FECT. 
Mrs. Edna Callaghan admitted that they never 
turned possession of the premises back to the plain-
tiffs at any time during the period from March 1, 
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1957 to July 29, 1963. (R 366 lines 20-22) Appel-
lants contend the case should be remanded to the 
trial court for a new trial to determine which dam-
ages occurred during a four month period from 
March 1, 1960 to June 30, 1960. This is the period 
between Exhibits 3 and 4, except Exhibit 4 is dated 
May 10, 1960 not June 30, 1960. Mrs. Callaghan 
testified that this period where they did not have 
a written lease was an accommodation for both par-
ties. (R 366 line 11-14) Defendants did not turn 
the possession back to the plaintiffs at any time dur-
ing this period. (R 366 line 20-22) The terms of the 
previous written lease applied during this hold over 
period. This is the way the parties themselves in-
tended as exhibited by the defendants retaining pos-
session and paying rent at the same amount as the 
previous written lease. (R 366 lines 17-19) 
Appellants contend a fatal defect in the plain-
tiffs' case because there is no finding as to when any 
of the damage occurred. Appellants have overlooked 
that the findings specifically provide that the dam-
ages occurred during "their occupancy of the prem-
ises." Finding of Fact No. 5 made by the trial court 
is that defendants resided at the home as tenants 
from early 1957 until vacating the premises on July 
31, 1963. (R 17) Finding No. 10, No. 11, No. 12, 
No. 14, No. 15, No. 16 and No. 17 provide that the 
damages or lost items occurred during defendants 
occupancy of the premises. (R 18 and 19) Finding 
No. 22 of the trial court provides that plaintiffs 
were not aware of many of the missing and damaged 
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items prior to the termination of the defendants 
tenancy. (R 20) 
It is true that the evidence does not state the 
exact date of many of the damages. However if the 
damages occurred during a period during which a 
lease was not in effect (and it is respondents' posi-
tion that a lease was in effect during all of the pos-
session of the defendants - s:upported by the cases 
set forth in Point I) then the burden shifts to 
the defendants to establish that the damages occurred 
during the period no lease was in effect. This i_s based 
upon the principle set forth in the case of M ott v. Good 
Roads Machinery Company, 277 App. DIV. 677, 102 
NY Supp. 2d 781, that the one who exclusively has 
the information runs the risk of a failure to produce. 
This principle that defendants must produce 
evidence of when the damages occurred is particu-
larly applicable in this case as this evidence lies pe-
culiarly within their knowledge. Plaintiffs have 
established and the trial court has found that dam-
ages occurred during the period of defendants ten-
ancy. Dr. Wight stated that he had no way of know-
ing when the damages occurred and that he did not 
maintain an inspection of the premises during the 
time the defendants were there. (R 103 lines 10-15) 
POINT III. 
DEFENDANTS WE R E NOT CHARGED 
WITH NORMAL WEAR AND TEAR NOR WITH 
IMPROVEMENTS. 
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In each of the applicable Findings of Fact the 
trial court expressly found that the damages were 
beyond reasonable wear and tear. (Findings 13, 14 
and 17. (R 19-20) In view of. the assertions in ap-
pellants' brief that the facts do not support the find-
ings made by the trial judge respondent will set forth 
below each of the items awarded by the trial court 
and list after each award the places in the record 
supporting the finding made by the trial court. 
Finding 9. 
Rent for July 1963 ------------------------$183.33 
( R 4 7 lines 26-30) ( R 48 lines 
1-15) 
Finding 10. Rug ___ ___ _ ______ ______ _ _ __ _ _______ ____ ______ __ _______ 200.00 
(R 49 lines 9-29) (R 50 lines 16-
23) 
Finding 11. 
Water damage dining room ____________ 13.76 
(R 54 lines 7-20) (R 55 line 9) 
Finding 12. Removed Items: 
Screen Door Closures ---------------------- 6.15 
(R 58 lines 13-21) 
Shields and Covers for Gable Lights _____________________ __ __ __ __ __ _____________ 12.00 
(R 59 lines 1-6) 
Screen for the Bar-Be-Que Pit ______ 9.16 
(R 59 lines 9-24) 35.00 Navajo Saddle Blanket ------------------
(R 59 line 29 toR 60 line 11) 10.95 Light Fixture in the Shop ----------------
(R 61lines 3-6) 
Night Latch in the Shop __________________ 3.75 
(R 61lines 17-23) 10.50 Screen Door in the Shop ------------------
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(R 61line 25 to R 62 line 4) 
Garage Door Handles ---------------------- 5.82 
( R 62 lines 8-24) 
Window Lock in the Garage __________ 3.25 
( R 62 lines 25-30) 
Door Stop in the Garage ------------------ 1.50 
( R 63 lines 2-5) 
Check Ropes in the Garage ------------ .60 
( R 64 lines 18-23) 
Wire Clothes Lines and Turnbuckles _ _ _ __ __ _ ___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ __ _ __ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ __ _ 2.85 
(R 64 lines 25-30) 
Bird Bath ---------------------------------------- 4.50 (R 65 lines 1-6) 
Total Missing Items ------------$105.13 
Finding 13. Damaged Items: 
Curtain Rods ------------------------------------$ 15.00 (R 57 lines 3-14) 
Broken Tile in the Bar-Be-Que Pit__ 4.28 
(R 66 line 14 to R 67 line 7) 
Broken Sprinkler Head ------------------ 2.00 
(R 67line 13 toR 68 line 13) 
Water Softener which was not 
useable ---------------------------------------------- 100.00 (R 68 line 25 toR 69 line 29) 
Electrical Outlets and Switches ____ 1.45 
(R 70 lines 5-16) 
Damages to the back wall lying 
along the East boundary of the 
property ------------------------------- ___________ __ 30.00 
(R 80 line 26 toR 81 line 27) 
Holes in the Rain Gutter 
on the Roof -------------------------------------- 2.50 (R 86 line 30 toR 87 line 20) 
Broken Lead Glass Window ____________ 10.00 
(R 97lines 5-10) (R 991ine 7) 
Burned Drain Board ---------------------- 45.00 
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(R 95 lines 2-6) (R 239 line 18) 
Gaping hole in Wall of an 
Upstairs Bedroom ---------------------------- 50.00 
(R 71line 11 toR 72 line 20) 
Total items damaged or 
broken ----------------------------------$258.43 
Finding 14. 
Yard Damage ------------------------------------$10.00 (R 84 lines 9-18) (R 411lines 
16-30) 
Finding 15. 
Water damage shop ------------------------$775.88 (R 56 lines 4-12) (R 56 lines 
21-25) (R 117 line 19) 
Finding 16. 
Bedroom rug ------------------------------------$ 26.00 (R 143 lines 15 to 27) 
Finding 17. Restoring Premises : 
( R 77 lines 17-21) 
(R 89lines 11-16) 
(R 90 lines 10-17) 
(R 90 line 25 toR 93line 6) 
(R 96line 22 toR 97line 5) 
(R 97lines 18 to 21) 
(R 132lines 8 toR 133 line 23) 
Spackle and Lumber ---------------------- 79.39 
(R 98 lines 1-4) 
Paints and other miscellaneous 
rna terials _____ ------------------------ __ ___________ 200.15 
(R 99 lines 9-12) 
Labor of a paper hanger __________________ 25.00 
(R 93 line 12) 
Labor of Plaintiff Guy H. Wight 
in repairing and restoring 
premises ------------------------- __________ __ _______ 300.00 
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(R 52 lines 11-19) (R 100 line 26 
toR 101line 14) _ 
Labor of Florence D. Wight in 
repairing and restoring premises __ 225.00 
(R 142line 15 toR 143line 14) 
(R 144 lines 18 to 29) (R 148 
lines 28 to 149line 26) (R 181 
lines 15 to R 182 line 9) 
Total of items in this 
Paragraph ----------------------------$829.54 
Finding 18. 
Attorney's fees --------------------------------$568.64 
(R 162lines 11-22) 
The trial court found that by the terms of the 
written leases executed by the parties the appellants 
were to keep the home and real property in a clean 
and satisfactory condition and upon termination of 
the tenancy to leave the premises, equipment, and 
furnishings in as good as condition as when entered 
upon, except for reasonable wear and tear or damage 
by the elements or fire. (Finding 6) (R 17 and 18) 
This finding is supported by paragraph No. 3 of 
Exhibits 2, 3 and 4. 
The trial court found that by the terms of the 
leases the appellants agreed to pay the respondent 
for all damage or injury to the premises during their 
tenancy. (Finding 7) (R 18) This finding is sup-
ported by paragraph No. 3 of Exhibits 2, 3 and 4. 
The trial court found that by the terms of said 
leases defendants agreed to pay for cleaning the 
premises upon the termination of the leases. (Find-
ing 8) (R 18) This finding is supported by para-
graph No.4 of Exhibits 2, 3 and 4. 
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In many instances the trial court did not grant 
the amount sought by respondent but instead granted 
less than the claimed damage : 
Damaged carpeting from smoldering and 
spilling of a can of paint, requested $300.00 
(R 50 lines 16-23) v $200.00 awarded; 
Ruined water softener $150.00 (R 69 
line 29) v $100.00 awarded; 
Labor of Plaintiff Guy Wight $600.00 
(R 101 lines 1-14) v $300.00 awarded; 
Labor of Florence D. Wight $525.00 (R 
183 lines 10-15) v $225.00 awarded; 
Gaping hole in the wall of upstairs bed-
room $135.00 (R 172 lines 19-20) v $50.00 
awarded; 
Restoration of yard $450.00 (R 183 line 
28 to R 185 line 7) v $10.00 awarded. 
The respondents having prevailed in the trial 
court are entitled to have the evidence on conflict-
ing matters viewed in a light most favorable to them. 
Weenig v. Manning, 1 Utah 2d 101, 262 P 2d 491 
and Larson v. Evans, 12 Utah 2d 245, 364 P 2d 1088. 
The case of Jespersen v. Deseret News Pub. Co., 
(1951) 119 Utah 235, 225 P 2d 1050 involved an 
action by a landlord against a tenant for rent and 
damages. The court said: 
This case being one brought to enforce 
the terms of a lease and no equitable iss?es 
being involved, this court can only revieW 
errors of law and not of fact. Art. VIII, Sec. 
9, Constitution of Utah. (225 P 2d page 1052) 
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In spite of this law respondents believe it is 
necessary to answer specifically the shotgun charges 
made by appellants in this point. The most pernicious 
charge made by appellants is that "probably" they 
have been charged twice for all items. (Page 14 of 
Appellants' Brief) This charge is not supported 
when the record is carefully examined. 
Appellants base this broad assertion on their 
contentions that $45.00 awarded for the burned 
drainboard (Finding 13) (R 19) and $1.45 for 
broken electrical outlets and switches (Finding 13) 
(R 19) were also included in the award for mate-
rials, Finding 17 ( R 20) . 
Dr. Wight was asked whether or not any of 
the damaged or missing items which had been item-
ized in his testimony were included in the general 
figures for materials and he answered that there 
is no duplication. (R 98 lines 23-24) He explained 
what items were represented in these general figures 
and that he had at the trial invoices for many items. 
(R 99 lines 4-30) 
Dr. Wight stated specifically that the $200.15 
figure awarded for paints and materials (and which 
appellants claim includes the burned drainboard 
and broken electrical outlets and switches) repre-
sents: "Just the paints and materials in the rooms 
I had to do over, because of damages to the walls I 
had to repair." (R 99 line 11-12) In Point No. III 
~ppellants have cited their evidence and completely 
Ignored the evidence of respondents which support 
the findings of the trial court. 
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Appellants argue that the rug for which the 
trial court awarded $200.00 in damage was worn 
out from years of tramping over it. (Page 12 of Ap-
pellants' Brief) Appellants overlook the testimony 
of a real estate agent who said this rug which covered 
all of four rooms of the downstairs of the house was 
in good condition. (R 33line 28-30) Appellants' own 
expert witness admitted that the rug was of high 
quality and would appear to have another ten years 
of useful life. ( R 237 line 3) 
This is the rug which when the premises were 
surrendered to respondent had a large smoldered 
area in the living room and a can of paint spilled 
on it in the guest bedroom. (R 49 lines 14-22) 
In arguing that this rug was worn out apellants 
overlook the fact that their witness estimated that 
this rug had been in use only five or six years. (R 
236 lines 26-27) 
Mr. Van Tassell, another witness called by ap-
pellants, admitted that the damaged rug was one of 
the reasons that he did not purchase this home from 
the respondents. (R 208 lines 13-14) He stated that 
it was a good rug and could have been used for some 
time in the home but for the damage. (R 209 lines 
6-11) 
Appellants object to being charged for a water 
softener. (Page 12 of Appellants' Brief) Plaintiffs 
testified the water softener was practically brand 
new when the tenancy started. (R 69 line 2) Doctor 
Wight testified that the water softener was not op-
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erative when the premises were surrendered by de-
fendants. (R 69 line 11-13) He stated that it was 
of a value of $150.00 (R 69 line 29) and was not 
repairable. (R 70 lines 3-4) The trial court correctly 
awarded judgment in the sum of $100.00 based upon 
this evidence. ( R 19) 
Appellants argue that "it is not at all uncom-
mon for a landlord to have to redecorate a vacated 
apartment only after a few months of occupancy, in 
order to find a new tenant." (Page 16 of Appellants' 
Brief) This argument overlooks the fact that re-
spondents were not seeking to have their premises 
redecorated but to recoup the damages which have 
been ite1nized previously in this point. 
Dr. Wight expressly stated that he had not in-
cluded any expenses which would be for normal wear 
and tear. (R 99 lines 19-30) He explained that he 
did not list costs on any items which could be attrib-
uted to normal wear and tear. (R 131 lines 14-28) 
Dr. Wight testified that the house was in top 
condition both inside and outside when the appel-
lants started their tenancy. ( R 135 lines 15-25) He 
also stated that the house had been professionally 
cleaned including the rugs prior to the appellants 
rnoving in. (R 135 lines 26-27) 
The repainting which was required was not due 
to the condition of the paint but the numerous nail 
and bolt holes which had been placed throughout the 
home. (R 144 lines 5-11) Mrs. Wight confirmed the 
fact that it would not have been necessary to repaint 
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the rooms, except for the hallway, if the appellants 
had not left so many holes and other damages to 
the walls. (R 159 lines 1-17) 
The general statements from Corpus Juris Se-
cundum defining "wear and tear" cited in appel-
lants' brief are not applicable to the facts of this 
case. The trial court expressly found that all items 
for which respondents have recovered were beyond 
reasonable wear and tear. Allowing the water to run 
over in the bathtub (R 54 lines 7-10); knocking out 
a hole in a wall ( R 71 line 23) ; spilling a can of paint 
on the rug and allowing it to smolder (R 49 lines 
16-19); allowing water to run from a broken pipe 
for 29 days ( R 56 lines 21 to 25) ; constructing a 
fire on the front lawn of a landscaped home (R 83 
lines 21 to 30) ; placing 42 nails in one panel door 
and 49 on two walls of a room (R 90 lines 28-29) 
is not reasonable wear and tear. 
At page 20 of their brief respondents have con-
fused the requirement for cleaning the premises up-
on the termination of the lease (Paragraph No. 4 
of Exhibits 2, 3 and 4) with the paragraph which 
has an exception for reasonable wear and tear. When 
the lease specifically provides, as it does in this case, 
that the tenants will pay for cleaning at the termi-
nation of the lease there is no point in citing cases 
to the effect that reasonable wear and tear would 
affect their duty to do the cleaning. 
Appellants cite a general statement from the 
An1erican Law of Property to the effect that it was 
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error for the trial court to charge defendants with 
fire damage even though appellants were negligent. 
(Page 21 of Appellants' Brief) The trial court has 
not charged appellants for fire damage. The evidence 
shows that there was no fire which caused damage 
to the rug. ( R 334 line 29 to R 335 line 3) Finding 
No. 10 specifically recognizes this evidence and states 
that the living room rug of the plaintiffs had smol-
dered without evidence of visible flame. (R 18) 
Appellants quote a general statement of Corpus 
Juris Secundum concerning damage by the elements. 
(Page 22 of Appellants' Brief) This statement 
covers repairs made necessary by water from freez-
ing to outer portions of the building. In this case 
the facts are that a pipe burst inside the building 
and sprayed the inside of the building for a period 
of at least 29 days. (R 56 lines 21 to 25) 
Appellants argue that the respondents have 
been unjustly enriched to such an extent that it 
shocks the conscience. The facts do not support such 
unwarranted assertions. A review of the facts in 
the record which have been previously outlined in 
this portion of this brief is a sufficient answer to 
such a broad assertion as this. 
POINT IV: 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT REFUSE 
TESTIMONY OF SUBSEQUENT ORAL REVI-
SION OR AMENDMENT OF WRITTEN CON-
TRACT. 
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In Point No. IV appellants contend that the 
trial court erred in refusing testimony regarding a 
verbal variance of the terms of the lease pertaining 
to repairs. Respondent can not understand how this 
would affect the findings or judgment of the trial 
court as respondents received no recovery for re-
. 
pa~rs. 
Even assuming it might have something to do 
with damages the record clearly shows that the trial 
court did not exclude any testimony or strike any 
testimony from the record. The trial court merely 
commented that a question of defense counsel was 
not important as there was no consideration for it. 
(R 317lines 12-13) No ruling was even .made by the 
trial court. Appellants made no attempt to show any 
consideration for a modification of the lease. The 
record shows defense counsel evidently fully ac-
quiesced in the trial court's statement and did not 
pursue the matter any further. 
Respondent has no dispute -with the law and 
case cited at page 24 of appellants' brief. There sim-
ply is no evidence of any agreement or of any con-
sideration for a new agreement in the record, and 
appellants made no attempt to establish for the rec-
ord. 
POINT V. 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF THE PLAIN-
TIFFS HAVING WAIVED OR BEING ES-
TOPPED TO CLAIM DAMAGES. 
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In making this claim the appellants evidently 
assume that all of the damages occurred prior to 
execution of the third lease on May 10, 1960. (Ex-
hibit 4) There is no evidence in the record that such 
is the case. 
Appellants argue that because plaintiff Dr. 
Wight was on the premises during the tenancy that 
he was aware of conditions. This is contrary to the 
evidence (R 103lines 10-15) and the findings of the 
trial court. (Finding 22 R 20) 
Appellants next argue that if plaintiffs were 
aware of conditions they had a duty to object. The 
law does not so require. In Volume 32 of Am Jur 
Section 815 of Landlord and Tenant it is stated as a 
general rule that no action lies for a breach of a 
covenant to leave in good condition until the expira-
tion of the tenancy. The reason for this rule is that 
although the tenant during the term allows the prem-
ises to become in bad condition he has a right to the 
premises and it cannot be said, because of their con-
dition at any time during the term, that they will 
not be left in a proper condition at the end of the 
term. 
POINT VI. 
APPELLANTS WERE NOT CHARGED 
WITH THE LOSS OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 
ABANDONED BY RESPONDENTS. 
Appellants' argue that a saddle blanket, bird 
bath and sprinkler are personal property (Page 26) 
The evidence shows that the saddle blanket was a 
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rug in the upstairs hallway (R 60 lines 2-7), that 
the bird bath top was in the yard ( R 65 line 4), and 
that the sprinkler was part of the system for water-
ing the yard. (R 67 line 13 to R 68 line 13) The 
$2.00 awarded for the sprinkler was not because the 
sprinkler was lost as erroneously argued by appel-
lants but because of damage to the sprinkler. (Find-
ing 13 described as broken sprinkler head) (R 19) 
Appellants acknowledged in Paragraph No. 12 
of the leases that all furnishing are received in good 
condition and they agree to return the same at the 
expiration of the lease in good condition, reasonable 
wear and tear accepted (Exhibits 2, 3 and 4) There 
is no evidence of any abandonment of these items 
by the respondents. 
POINT VII. 
FINDING 9 IS NOT CONTRARY TO THE 
EVIDENCE AND RENT WAS OWED TO RE-
SPONDENT. 
Appellants do not dispute that they owe rent 
for the month of July. They dispute this rent is owed 
to respondents. Appellants argument is that one Glen 
Van Tassel was entitled to this rent rather than the 
respondents. (Page 28 of Appellants' Brief) 
Appellants could produce no evidence at the 
trial that they had paid Mr. Van Tassel the rent for 
this month. Mrs. Callaghan was asked directly 
whether or not she could produce a cancelled check 
showing that Mr. Van Tassel had been paid this rent 
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and she could not do so. ( R 362 line 29 to R 363 
line 1) 
In Point No. VII the appellants rely on a pur-
ported agreement covered by Finding No. 21 made 
by the trial court. ( R 20) In this finding the trial 
judge held that the uniform real estate contract was 
not supported by legal consideration and was not a 
binding agreement. (R 18) Mr. Van Tassel admitted 
he has no claim to the premises. (R 197 lines 26-28) 
Defendants called Mr. Van Tassel as a witness 
and he did not testify as to receiving any rent from 
them. (R 190-221) He does not claim he is entitled 
to this rent. To the contrary he admits that he did 
not go through with the contract to purchase the 
home and he has no claim to the premises. (R 197 
lines 26-28) (Exhibit 10 where Van Tassel releases 
any claims under the purported agreement to re-
spondents.) 
The rent for July of 1963 was owed to respond-
ents as the trial court found. ( R 18) 
POINT VIII 
PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO A JUDG-
MENT FOR COSTS. 
Plaintiffs Point VIII is based upon the errone-
ous assumption that plaintiffs did not file a memo-
randum of costs. The memorandum of costs is found 
in the record at page 440 and 441. 
This memorandum was filed in the District 
Court within five days of the completion of the trial 
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in this action, and a copy of the memorandum of 
costs was served upon appellants by mailing them 
a copy on the day prior to filing with the District 
Court. (R 441) 
CROSS APPEAL 
POINT I. 
THE ATTORNEY'S FEE AWARDED TO 
RESPONDENT IS INSUFFICIENT TO COV-
ER THE FEES INCURRED IN THIS APPEAL. 
The agreements executed by the parties provide 
for payment of a reasonable attorney's fees if re-
spondents are compelled to commence an action for 
dan1age or re11ts. (Paragraph 8 of Exhibits 2, 3 and 
4) Both parties agreed to attorney's fees in a sum 
set by the Utah State Bar Advisory Handbook. (R 
162 lines 11-22) The trial court has awarded as rea-
sonable attorney's fees the amount set forth in the 
Advisory Handbook for a default case presented 
without proof as to the reasonableness of attorney's 
fees in actions for the collection of money. Finding 
18 (R 20) 
The Advisory Handbook provides for a fee of 
$500.00 for representing a respondent before the 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Respondent is aware of the rule that attorney's 
fees on appeal are discretionary with the Supreme 
Court. Swain v. Salt Lake Real Estate and Invest-
?nent Company 3 Utah 2d 121, 279 P 2d 709 (1955) 
It is respectfully submitted that an additional fee 
of $500.00 should be awarded to the respondent for 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
25 
the purpose of covering their additional costs occa-
sioned by this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment awarded to respondents by the 
trial court is supported by the facts in the record. 
Appellants have advanced no legal basis for remand-
ing this case for further trial or eliminating any 
part of the judgment. 
It is respectfully requested that this court af-
firm the judgment of the trial court and award an 
additional $500.00 to the respondents for their at-
torney's fees incurred because of this appeal. 
Respectfully submitted 
RICHARDS, BIRD & 
HART & 
LON RODNEY KUMP 
716 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for 
Respondents 
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